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INTRODUCTION 
As the companion to this Article explains,1 controversy persists 
over exactly why the Fourteenth Amendment—the federal 
Constitution’s most important provision—was legitimately adopted. 
Congress excluded representatives from the defeated South when it 
proposed the Amendment in 1866 (thereby allowing the two-thirds 
proposal votes in each house) and kept them out until Southern states 
ratified it in 1868 (thereby allowing a three-fourths ratification vote 
among states). Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, John Harrison, and 
Thomas Colby offer four different theories to justify the Amendment.2 
Ackerman finds such legitimacy in national politics and a new, non-
Article V ability to coerce state ratifications.3 Harrison finds a 
somewhat diluted form of legitimacy—“lawfulness”—in the formal 
lack of prohibition on such coercion, despite the fact that Article V4 was 
designed to prevent amendments without genuine three-fourths 
support among the states.5 Amar roots the amendment’s legitimacy in 
 
 1.  Christopher R. Green, The South Tried to Secede, and You’ll Never Guess What 
Happened Next: Loyal Denominatorism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317471 [hereinafter STS]. 
 2.  Id. at 16–17, nn.23–26 and accompanying text. 
 3.  2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 233–49 (1998). 
 4.  U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it 
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution . . . which . . . shall be valid to all 
Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-
fourths of the several States . . . .”). 
 5.  John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
375, 457–58 (2001) (asserting that the purpose of Article V was to prevent constitutional change 
opposed by a sectional coalition in control of more than one-fourth of the states). Lawrence Tribe 
distinguished “lawfulness” from “legitimacy” in a tweet following John Lewis’s attack on 
President Trump’s legitimacy. Laurence Tribe (@tribelaw), TWITTER (Jan. 16, 2017, 3:40 AM), 
https://goo.gl/1F5QWi (“I revere John Lewis but think it might’ve helped for him to distinguish 
‘legitimate’ from ‘lawful[.]’ A lawful POTUS can still be illegitimate.”). 
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use of Article IV6 to support a federal demand for black suffrage.7 
Colby roots the Amendment’s legitimacy in its morally-justified use (as 
Colby sees it) by later generations.8 
Rather than nationalizing, democratizing, formalizing, or 
intergenerationalizing the constitutional author of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, this Article and its companion defend still a fifth tack: 
excluding rebel States from the Article V denominator. We the People 
who enacted the Fourteenth Amendment were We the Reliably Loyal 
People, exercising their jus post bellum rights prior to re-establishing 
legal peace. The Fourteenth Amendment became law on February 12, 
1867, when 20 of the 26 states exercising federal political power had 
ratified it, rather than in July 1868, when 28 of the full 37 states in the 
Union had done so. The Thirteenth Amendment on this view also gets 
a bit older, becoming law in June rather than December 1865. 
Loyal denominatorism reads “the several States” in Article V—and 
kindred phrases in Articles I, II, and IV—to have a tacit limit to reliably 
loyal States with whom the federal government is legally in a state of 
peace. This sort of tacit limit is not an exotic, idiosyncratic theory fitting 
only the fevered minds of the likes of Charles Sumner and Thaddeus 
Stevens. The companion Article shows that this theory was articulated, 
and in compelling detail, by many other Republicans during 
Reconstruction—and was assumed even by then-Senator Andrew 
Johnson in 1861—continuing through 1868, when many Republicans 
said the Fourteenth Amendment was already law even before Southern 
ratifications.9 Many commentators, like Joel Prentiss Bishop, John 
Codman Hurd, and J.W. Burgess, adopted this view.10 
Moreover, they were right. This Article shows how a loyal 
denominator follows from: (1) commonplace ancient, medieval, and 
 
 6.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union 
a Republican Form of Government . . . .”). 
 7.  Akhil Amar, Lindsey Ohlsson Worth, & Joshua Alexander Geltzer, Reconstructing the 
Republic: The Great Transition of the 1860s, in TRANSITIONS 114 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012); see also 
Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—And Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 
109, 112 (2013) (“At a certain point, states with abysmal track records could be deemed 
unrepublican within the meaning of Article IV . . . .”). 
 8.  Thomas Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 107 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1627, 1681 (2013) (preferring “our own evolving understanding of the lofty freedoms 
that are guaranteed by the abstract terms of the Fourteenth Amendment” to the “outdated, and 
even-at-the-time highly controversial, nineteenth-century notions of liberty and equality that 
were held by the prevailing Unionists”). 
 9.  STS, supra note 1, at 23 n.38 and accompanying text. 
 10.  Id. at 60 n.222, 61 n.226, and 61 n.228 and accompanying text. 
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contemporary insights into tacit limits in language; (2) universally-
recognized canons on agreements’ tacit limits during armed conflict; 
(3) similarly uncontroversial jus post bellum rules governing the timing 
of the re-establishment of peace in the eyes of the law; and (4) 
congressional power to delay such re-establishment under its declare-
war power. None of these steps requires us to venture beyond well-
established, secure territory. Indeed, denying a loyal denominator 
requires resisting a nearly universal consensus of informed observers 
on at least one of these four points. 
Section I of this Article explains the linguistic background to how 
we might read “the several States” in Article V as, in context, tacitly 
meaning “the several [reliably loyal] States”; this rebuts Harrison’s 
hyper-textualist and formalist arguments to the contrary and shows 
why he himself, in inferring a tacit relationship between Article VI and 
other constitutional powers, uses such linguistic moves. Section II 
considers the specific canon of interpretation under the law of armed 
conflict that friendship-presupposing agreements are tacitly suspended 
when war breaks out between their parties. Section III considers how 
long such wartime suspension lasts: as long as the victor deems it 
necessary to achieve sufficient security for its victory. Section IV 
considers where such peacetime-delaying power lies in the American 
scheme: clearly Congress, which has the power to declare that a state of 
war (still) exists, and which, in the context of Reconstruction, declared 
in July 1866 that all “political relations” were suspended until Congress 
acted, and in March 1867 declared that former Confederate states 
besides Tennessee were even then still “rebel States.” 
Section V explains four implications of this view of Fourteenth 
Amendment legitimacy. First, by narrowing the scope of the Article V 
actor, we eliminate coercion from the process of constitutional 
adoption and see its adoption as the product of “reflection and choice” 
by the loyal North. Second, moving up the date of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s adoption requires us to reclassify Reconstruction Act 
coercion of the South as part of the Amendment’s enforcement, rather 
than its adoption. This move properly frames Southern intransigence in 
response to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as a jus post 
bellum problem, shows the folly of the fiction that all states in the 
Union stand as equal sovereigns, and illuminates how the Constitution 
presents itself on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Third, this Article’s 
argument shows why context-sensitive tacit restrictions are important 
in assessing the Constitution’s original meaning. Fourth, a Northern 
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author affects the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning in cases like 
Brown v. Board of Education,11 McDonald v. Chicago,12 and for the 
history of substantive due process. 
I. TACIT DOMAIN RESTRICTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, AND 
LAW 
John Harrison, one of the few contemporary thinkers to explicitly 
consider and reject a loyal Article V denominator, bases his argument 
on the text: “Article V, however, is pretty clear about this: three-fourths 
of the states. If South Carolina was still a state, it counted.”13 At first 
glance, this argument may seem compelling, at least to a textualist (like 
me14). But the text only expresses meaning in a context, and that 
context supplies implicit domain limitations. 
A. Philosophy 
Tacit restrictions on quantifier domain are a well-worn part of 
modern linguistics and philosophy of language. As Larry Solum noted 
in one of his classic parodies, using current philosophy of language and 
linguistics to interpret an eighteenth-century text is akin to using 
modern chemistry to understand an eighteenth-century explosion.15 
Modern philosophers and linguists regularly avert to “tacit quantifier 
domain restriction” to explain various bits of linguistic data. Daniel 
Korman uses a well-worn example:  
If I were to open the fridge in search of beer and say ‘there is no 
beer,’ what you would probably understand me to be saying is that 
there is no beer in the fridge. In other words, you would take me to 
be tacitly restricting the domain of my quantifier to things in the 
fridge.16 
 
 11.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 12.  561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 13.  Harrison, supra note 5, at 421. 
 14.  See, e.g., Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis 
for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607 (2009). 
 15.  Larry Solum, Rakove on the Historical Case for Original Ideas Originalism, LEGAL 
THEORY BLOG, (Apr. 1, 2016, 12:31 PM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2016/04/rakove-
on-the-historical-case-for-original-ideas-originalism.html (“Using Grice’s theory of meaning to 
understand an eighteenth century text is no more sensible than using twentieth century chemistry 
to understand an eighteenth century explosion.”). 
 16.  DANIEL Z. KORMAN, OBJECTS: NOTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY 42 (2015). The beer-
in-the-fridge example goes back at least to DAVID K. LEWIS, ON THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS 
136 (1986) (“[W]hen I say such things, I am restricting my quantifers, just as when I look in the 
fridge and say that there is no beer. I do not deny that there is beer outside the fridge, but I ignore 
it in my speech.”). 
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Kai von Fintel notes that “all quantifiers have a hidden domain 
argument, whose value is contextually supplied.”17 Tacit, contextually-
supplied restrictions on interpreting quantifiers in natural language is 
not—like, say, the analytic-synthetic distinction18—an issue on which 
philosophers disagree; contemporary philosophers and linguists take it 
as an uncontroversial datum to be explained. 
B. History 
While the most sophisticated tools available should be used to 
understand how language operates and had operated in the past, the 
same basic idea was well known as long ago as Aristotle. The 
Nicomachean Ethics defend equitable interpretation to correct the 
“error through speaking without qualification” (sometimes translated 
“oversimplicity”) of the outward form of language,19 while the Rhetoric 
likewise argues that because “no exact definition is possible, but 
legislation is necessary,” and because of the “infinite number of cases,” 
we must interpret legislators’ work equitably.20 Aristotle’s example was 
a penalty enhancement for striking a victim with an iron; an assailant 
who happened to wear an iron ring might fall under a hyper-literal 
reading of the enhancement, but the enhancement should be 
interpreted to apply only to those who strike others with an iron when 
 
 17.  Kai von Fintel, Restrictions on Quantifier Domains 28 (May 1994) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Massachusetts) (on file with the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law 
& Public Policy); cf. Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson, Quantifiers and Context-Dependence, 
55 ANALYSIS 291, 291 (1995) (“As is familiar, the truth of an utterance of a sentence containing 
a quantified expression must be evaluated with respect to a contextually determined domain.”); 
Jason Stanley & Zoltan Szabo, On Quantifier Domain Restriction, 15 MIND & LANGUAGE 219, 
219 (2000) (“The topic of this paper is the problem of quantifier domain restriction, which is a 
special case of the problem of context dependence.”); LEWIS, supra note 16, at 164 (“[P]art of the 
ordinary meaning of any idiom of quantification consists in the susceptibility to restrictions; and 
that restrictions come and go with the pragmatic wind.”); FRANCOIS RECANTI, LITERAL 
MEANING 87 (2004) (disagreeing with Stanley and Szabo’s treatment of tacit quantifier domain 
restriction, but treating the phenomenon itself as utterly uncontroversial); id. at 104 n.11 (noting 
history of idea in modern linguistics). 
 18.  See THE PHILPAPERS SURVEYS, https://goo.gl/LPaEUK (last visited Oct. 6, 2017) 
(finding, in a November 2009 survey, that 64.9% of philosophers say “yes” or “lean toward” 
saying “yes” to analytic-synthetic distinction, 27.1% “no” or “lean no”). 
 19.  ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 5.10.5 175 (F. H. Peters trans., 5th ed. 1893). 
 20.  ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 1.13.13-14 147 (Freese trans., 1947) (“[B]eing unable to define 
for all cases, [legislators] are obliged to make a universal statement, which is not applicable to all, 
but only to most, cases; and whenever it is difficult to give a definition owing to the infinite number 
of cases, as, for instance, the size and kind of an iron instrument used in wounding; for life would 
not be long enough to reckon all the possibilities. If then no exact definition is possible, one must 
have recourse to general terms.”). 
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the iron makes the assault more serious.21 This domain restriction is 
tacit. 
English law’s use of the same idea was discussed extensively by 
multiple authors. Discussing tacit insanity or infancy defenses and 
relying on Aristotle, Edmund Plowden noted in 1574 that “this 
correction of the general words is much used in the law of England.”22  
Coke’s Institutes noted in 1639 that equitable interpretation was 
required because “the Law-maker could not possibly set downe all 
cases in expresse termes.”23 Isaac Watts noted in a 1724 textbook that 
quantifiers like “all, every, whatsoever” are, depending on the context, 
“used in a more extensive, or more limited sense.”24 Emer de Vattel in 
1758 noted that there are “exceptions so clear, that it is unnecessary to 
express them.”25 Blackstone in 1768 noted that tacit equitable 
exceptions were required because “all cases cannot be foreseen; or, if 
foreseen, cannot be expressed.”26 Also following Aristotle, James 
Wilson noted in 1790 that equitable interpretation was required 
because it was “impossible to specify or to foresee every case.”27 
C. Law 
Moreover, recognizing tacit restrictions on the domains of 
constitutional and statutory language has always been commonplace at 
the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. Maryland’s discussion of “necessary” 
notes the importance of context in explaining precisely what 
constitutional language expresses. Marshall explained: 
 
 21.  See id. (“[I]f a man wearing a ring lifts up his hand to strike or actually strikes, according 
to the written law he is guilty of wrongdoing, but in reality he is not; and this is a case for equity.”). 
 22.  Eyston v. Studd, 75 Eng. Rep. 688, 696 (1574) (U.K.). 
 23.  2 EDWARD COKE, Institutes of the Lawes of England, in THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND 
SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 573, 682 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) (1639). 
 24.  ISAAC WATTS, LOGIC: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON IN THE INQUIRY AFTER 
TRUTH 60 (1792) (1724). Watts discusses quantifiers as part of an extended explanation of the 
ways in which words can be “equivocal,” a discussion similar to Madison’s discussion of language 
in the Federalist Papers. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON ET AL., THE FEDERALIST 183 (Carey & 
McClellan eds. 2001) (No. 37, James Madison) (“All new laws, though penned with the greatest 
technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or 
less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of 
particular discussions and adjudications.”). The second item in Madison’s papers is a series of 
notes on Watts’s textbook, likely prepared at Princeton. See 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 
32–42 (Hutchinson & Rachal eds., 1962), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-
01-02-0003. 
 25.  EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 427 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore 
eds., 2008) (1758) (citing Seneca the rhetorician). 
 26.  2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430. 
 27.  2 JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 924 
(Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., Liberty Fund 2007) (1790) (part 2, chapter 3). 
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Almost all compositions contain words, which, taken in their 
rigorous sense, would convey a meaning different from that which is 
obviously intended. It is essential to just construction, that many 
words which import something excessive, should be understood in a 
more mitigated sense—in that sense which common usage justifies. 
. . . A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or 
indispensably necessary. To no mind would the same idea be 
conveyed by these several phrases.28 
In 1919 and 1920, the Supreme Court endorsed tacit restriction to 
the Article V denominator—albeit at the proposal stage, rather than at 
ratification—in two cases concerning veto overrides29 and the 
Eighteenth Amendment.30 The Court held that only two thirds of those 
voting, not two thirds of the entire membership of the houses of 
Congress, was required to propose an amendment. This precise 
denominator was not set out in the text of Article V, but only implicit 
from context. Only those participating in the amendment-proposal 
process counted in setting the proposal denominator. An analogous 
principle would similarly limit the ratification denominator to those 
states participating in federal political power. 
The commonplace nature of tacit limits to language was clear in 
1994. Echoing Plowden’s 1574 discussion of implicit mens rea 
requirements, the Court inferred a knowledge requirement for the 
criminalization of machine-gun possession, despite “[s]ilence” in the 
statute.31 The concurrence and dissent quarreled only with whether an 
implicit exception was warranted in the case, not with the general 
principle of tacit contextual limits.32 
A tacit loyalty requirement for Article I, Article II, or Article V 
power can be seen as a tacit “good mind” restriction analogous to the 
“bad mind” inferences of the criminal law. Insane people are not 
subject to the facially-exceptionless words of the criminal law, and 
rebellious States likewise cannot partake of facially-exceptionless 
federal political power in the Constitution. 
 
 28.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 414 (1819). 
 29.  Mo. Pac. Railway v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276, 281–84 (1919) (discussing history of limited 
Article V proposal denominator beginning from the Bill of Rights). 
 30.  Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920) (briefly following Missouri Pacific). 
 31.  Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994); cf. Morissette v. United States, 342 
U.S. 246, 252 (1952) (inferring mens rea “even if their enactments were silent on the subject”). 
 32.  See Staples, 511 U.S. at 621 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that government conceded 
existence of implicit mens rea requirement, quarreling only with its precise content); id. at 626 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he lack of an express knowledge requirement . . . is not 
dispositive . . . .”). 
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D. Tacit Domain Restrictions During the Civil War and 
Reconstruction 
While Harrison finds clarity in the simple, unqualified word 
“states” in Article V, everyone during Reconstruction acknowledged 
the existence of some tacit conditions on states’ powers under the 
Constitution. The most radical theory denied even President Johnson’s 
ability to impose additional conditions, but taking the Article VI oath 
was seen as a bare minimum.33 Indeed, Harrison himself interprets 
Article VI as tacitly limiting Article I powers: 
Article VI indicates that a state government, in order to qualify as 
such, must through its law recognize the supremacy of federal law. 
[Harrison here simply footnotes Article VI itself.] Its officers must 
in general be bound by the Article VI oath. Hence whatever else 
they were, the organizations that sent senators to Richmond were 
not governments of United States. Article VI imposes a necessary 
condition for loyalty: a state government must represent itself as 
such in its law.34 
This is not actually what Article VI says—not explicitly. The Article 
VI oath nowhere establishes itself explicitly as a condition precedent 
to Article I powers; officials are simply required to take the oath, and 
are not subject to any particular penalty if they do not.35 Harrison 
resists adding any further conditions like loyalty to the exercise of 
Article I powers beyond the Article VI oath, because “the Constitution 
does not indicate this explicitly.”36 But neither does it indicate a 
condition-precedent relationship between Article VI and Article I 
explicitly. The Office of Legal Counsel noted properly in 1985—an 
opinion to which President Obama’s advisors apparently looked when 
considering whether to re-do his oath following its garbling at his first 
inauguration37—that “the taking of the oath is not, strictly speaking, a 
prerequisite to assumption of the powers and duties of the 
 
 33.  See WILLIAM A. DUNNING, ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION AND 
RELATED TOPICS 102 (1897) (“[I]t became the duty of the officers to take the oath required by 
the constitution, of the legislature to provide for the dispatch of congressmen to Washington, and 
of the people of the state to submit to the authority of the courts and officials of the national 
government. These steps having being taken, the Union would stand under the constitution as 
before the war.”). 
 34.  Harrison, supra note 5, at 431. 
 35.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, 
and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of 
the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support 
this Constitution . . . .”). 
 36.  Harrison, supra note 5, at 432. 
 37.  See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH 4, 1–15 (2012). 
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Presidency.”38 Resolving when statutory or constitutional provisions 
tacitly establish conditions precedent to other provisions is sometimes 
quite difficult.39 It is a mistake to pretend that these relationships 
between provisions are actually explicit simply because the first 
provision is set out in the text. 
Similarly, even if Southern governments were not republican in 
form under Article IV,40 jumping to those governments’ lack of Article 
I powers would also require tacit conditions in Article I. The question 
is not whether there are tacit conditions at all, but what those tacit 
conditions are. 
E. Is a Tacit Loyalty Requirement Too Vague? 
Harrison is right that “the concept of loyalty [is] both vague and 
difficult to implement.”41 But sometimes the Constitution is vague and 
difficult to implement. On this issue too, Aristotle had it right: 
We must be content if we can attain to so much precision in our 
statement as the subject before us admits of . . . . [W]e must be 
content if we can indicate the truth roughly and in outline . . . . [I]t 
is the mark of an educated man to require, in each kind of inquiry, 
just so much exactness as the subject admits of: it is equally absurd to 
accept probable reasoning from a mathematician, and to demand 
scientific proof from an orator.42 
Macaulay’s answer to the doctrine of absolute non-resistance to the 
king, which he analogizes to self-defense, eloquently strikes a similar 
theme: 
A good action is not distinguished from a bad action by marks so 
plain as those which distinguish a hexagon from a square. There is a 
 
 38.  Operation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment Respecting Presidential Succession, 9 Op. 
O.L.C. 65, 67 (1985). 
 39.  See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. United States ex rel. Rigsby, 137 S. Ct. 436, 
442 (2016) (explaining that while the seal requirement for False Claim Act relators is mandatory, 
its breach does not necessarily mean that the case must be dismissed; “[a]lthough the duty is 
mandatory, the sanction for breach is not loss of all later powers to act”) (quoting United States 
v. Montalvo–Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 718 (1990)); In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 403 (Miss. 2012) 
(breach of publication requirement does not invalidate subsequent pardon, even though that 
requirement is mandatory). 
 40.  See, e.g., Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—And Thus of Section 5, supra note 7, at 
112 (“At a certain point, states with abysmal track records could be deemed unrepublican within 
the meaning of Article IV . . . .”). 
 41.  Harrison, supra note 5, at 432; see also id. at 421 (explaining that a loyal denominator 
would “introduc[e] another layer of uncertainty into Article V, which performs its function better 
the clearer it is”). 
 42.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 19, at 3–4 (section 1.3) (emphasis added). 
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frontier where virtue and vice fade into each other . . . . All our jurists 
hold that a certain quantity of risk to life or limb justifies a man in 
shooting or stabbing an assailant: but they have long given up in 
despair the attempt to describe, in precise words, that quantity of 
risk . . . . A man beset by assassins is not bound to let himself be 
tortured and butchered without using his weapons, because nobody 
has ever been able precisely to define the amount of danger which 
justifies homicide. Nor is a society bound to endure passively all that 
tyranny can inflict, because nobody has ever been able precisely to 
define the amount of misgovernment which justifies rebellion.43 
Harrison’s demand for precision in Article V at the cost of 
abandoning the power of constitutional amendment during the war 
contrasts sharply with his toleration of some vagueness in other 
Fourteenth Amendment contexts. He correctly reads the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause as a general ban on second-class citizenship,44 a 
concept whose boundaries will undoubtedly be fuzzy.45 Harrison noted 
famously in defense of that fuzziness, “I do not suggest that there are 
easy answers to the questions thus formulated, but they have the virtue 
of being the Constitution’s questions rather than our own.”46 This is 
exactly right; if, in context, some of the Constitution’s provisions have 
vague tacit limits on their domains, our desire for a precise Constitution 
will be unsatisfied. 
II. “STATES” AS TACITLY LIMITED TO “LOYAL STATES” 
Harrison’s concern about the vagueness of a tacit limit on 
constitutional powers is, however, a real one: equitable interpretation 
can seem to open the door to freewheeling textual revision and a simple 
refusal to obey controlling authority. Even while they argued that tacit 
domain restrictions were inevitable, Vattel in 1758 noted the need to be 
 
 43.  2 THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION 
OF JAMES II 305 (chapter 9) (Harper & Brothers ed., 1850) (hyphenation and emphasis added). 
 44.  John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 
1388–89 (1992) (“[A]n amendment that forbade the states from abridging privileges or 
immunities would ban caste legislation with respect to citizens’ rights . . . .”). 
 45.  CHRISTOPHER R. GREEN, EQUAL CITIZENSHIP, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: THE ORIGINAL SENSE OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 15–16 
(2015) [hereinafter EQUAL CITIZENSHIP] (giving similar equal-citizenship-focused reading, and 
noting Republican acknowledgment during Reconstruction of the Clause’s imprecise 
boundaries). 
 46.  Harrison, supra note 44, at 1389; cf. McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 855 (2010) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“To be sure, interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause may 
produce hard questions. But they will have the advantage of being questions the Constitution asks 
us to answer.”). 
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“very cautious and moderate” in inferring tacit exceptions,47 while 
Wilson in 1790 urged the “greatest circumspection.”48 
One way to be cautious and circumspect is to carefully examine 
how interpretive domain-restriction conventions have been used in the 
past. Made-up interpretive tacit domain restrictions give others reason 
to be skeptical. Loyal denominatorism, however, need not resort to ad 
hocery. It can rely on a tacit restriction well-recognized long before the 
Constitution was adopted: the suspension of friendship-presupposing 
relationships while their constituents are at war with each other.  This 
rule undergirds the consensus the Court noted in 1869 in Texas v. White: 
“All admit that, during this condition of civil war, the rights of the State 
as a member, and of her people as citizens of the Union, were 
suspended.”49 
A. Commentators 
A long line of thinkers about the law of armed conflict have held 
that friendly commerce among the subjects of warring powers is 
implicitly suspended during war. Grotius explained in 1625, “War 
denounced against a Sovereign, is presumed at the same Time to be 
denounced, not only against all his Subjects, but also others who shall 
join him, and who ought to be considered, in Regard to him, only as an 
Accessory.”50 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui explained in 1747 why treaties 
of commerce were tacitly restricted during war: “As soon as war has 
been declared against a sovereign, it is presumed to be declared at the 
same time not only against all his subjects, who, in conjunction with him, 
form one moral person.”51 
Vattel framed this rule as a “tacit supposition of the continuance of 
peace” in 1758: 
The conventions, the treaties made with a nation, are broken or 
annulled by a war arising between the contracting parties, either 
because those compacts are grounded on a tacit supposition of the 
continuance of peace, or because each of the parties, being 
 
 47.  VATTEL, supra note 25, at 430. 
 48.  WILSON, supra note 27, at 924. 
 49.  Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 727 (1869). 
 50.  3 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 1265 (Richard Tuck ed., 2005) 
(1625) (bk. 3, ch. 3, § 9); cf. id. at 1281 (bk. 3., ch. 4, § 8) (“[W]hen War is proclaimed against a 
Nation, it is at the same Time proclaimed against all of that Nation . . . .”). 
 51.  2 JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW 485 
(Petter Korkman ed., Thomas Nugent trans., 2006) (1748) (bk. 2, pt. 4, ch. 4, § 20). 
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authorised to deprive his enemy of what belongs to him, takes from 
him those rights which he had conferred on him by treaty.52 
Vattel’s basic rule is that agreements intended to govern hostile 
relationships would still be in effect during a war—the Geneva 
Conventions governing jus in bello would be obvious modern 
examples—but that amity-presupposing agreements like treaties of 
commerce would not. This rule has been followed with remarkable 
unanimity by later interpreters. Chancellor James Kent held in 1832 
that “obligations of treaties are dissipated by hostility” except for 
“stipulations which contemplate a state of future war, and make 
provision for such an exigency.”53 Henry Wheaton, citing Vattel and 
Kent, noted in 1836, “Treaties, properly so called, or foedera, are those 
of friendship and alliance, commerce and navigation . . . which even if 
perpetual in terms, expire of course . . . [i]n case of war between the 
contracting parties; unless such stipulations as are made expressly with 
a view to a rupture . . . .”54 
B. Cases 
A long line of cases and arbitrations has applied this distinction 
between hostility-presupposing and amity-presupposing agreements. 
This includes a surprisingly large number related to the suspension of 
the 1794 Jay Treaty during the War of 1812.55 In 1814, the Supreme 
Court through Justice Johnson noted that war cut off any “[i]ntercourse 
inconsistent with actual hostility,” such as ordinary commerce.56 The 
Court explained, “In the state of war, nation is known to nation only by 
their armed exterior; each threatening the other with conquest or 
annihilation. The individuals who compose the belligerent states, exist, 
as to each other, in a state of utter occlusion. If they meet, it is only in 
combat.”57 Following Grotius, Burlamaqui, and Vattel, Chancellor Kent 
decided in 1819, “[T]he idea that any commercial intercourse or pacific 
 
 52.  VATTEL, supra note 25, at 576 (3.10, § 175). Vattel then made an exception for “those 
treaties by which certain things are stipulated in case of a rupture,” reasoning that “by treaties of 
this nature, we mean to provide for what shall be observed in case of a rupture,” and so “we 
renounce the right of cancelling them by a declaration of war.” Id. at 576–77. 
 53.  1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 165 (1826). 
 54.  HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (section 3.2.8) (1836); see 
also id. at 369 (section 4.4.3) (“[D]ebts previously contracted between the respective subjects, 
though the remedy for their recovery is suspended during the war, are revived on the restoration 
of peace.”). 
 55.  Most of these provisions concerned the relationship between the United States and 
Canada, especially Atlantic fishing rights. See, e.g., infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 56.  The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155, 163 (1814). 
 57.  Id. at 160–61. 
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dealing could lawfully subsist between them [American citizens and 
British subjects], without the clear and express sanction of the 
government, is utterly inconsistent with the new class of duties growing 
out of a state of war.”58 This rule applied “even though no express 
prohibition of trade should be issued.”59 In 1823, the Supreme Court 
held that “treaties stipulating for permanent rights, and general 
arrangements, and professing to aim at perpetuity” were not 
completely abrogated by war, but “only suspended while it lasts.”60 The 
abrogation-versus-suspension issue, still involving the War of 1812, was 
at stake in the 1910 fisheries dispute between the U.S. and Britain.61 
In 1920, applying the same friendship-presupposing-versus-war-
compatible distinction set out by Vattel, Kent, and Wheaton, future 
Justice Cardozo waxed lyrical on the difficulty of determining whether 
a particular treaty presupposed friendship between warring nations: 
The effect of war upon the existing treaties of belligerents is one of 
the unsettled problems of the law . . . . International law to-day does 
not preserve treaties or annul them regardless of the effects 
produced. It deals with such problems pragmatically, preserving or 
annulling as the necessities of war exact. It establishes standards, but 
it does not fetter itself with rules . . . . This does not mean, of course, 
that there are not some classes of treaties about which there is 
general agreement. Treaties of alliance fall. Treaties of boundary or 
cession, “dispositive” or “transitory” conventions, survive . . . . So, of 
course, do treaties which regulate the conduct of hostilities . . . . 
Intention in such circumstances is clear. These instances do not 
represent distinct and final principles. They are illustrations of the 
same principle. They are applications of a standard. When I ask what 
that principle or standard is, and endeavor to extract it from the long 
chapters in the books, I get this, and nothing more, that provisions 
compatible with a state of hostilities, unless expressly terminated, 
will be enforced, and those incompatible rejected.62 
Cardozo agreed with the Institute of International Law: “Treaties 
of alliance, those which establish a protectorate or a sphere of influence, 
 
 58.  Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 438, 447 (N.Y. 1819). 
 59.  Id. at 460. 
 60.  Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464, 494–95 
(1823). 
 61.  See Arnold Pronto, The Effect of War on Law—What Happens to Their Treaties when 
States Go to War?, 2 CAMB. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 227, 228 (2013) (“Contemporary international 
law recognises [sic] an intermediate position, whereby treaties between parties to an armed 
conflict might be automatically suspended for the duration of the conflict, only to be revived 
afterwards . . . .”). 
 62.  Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 240–41 (1920). 
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and generally treaties of a political nature, are, it is said, dissolved.”63 
The “political” language goes back at least to Carlos Calvo’s 1863 
French treatise: “[A]ll are agreed in admitting the rupture of 
conventional ties concluded expressly with a view to a state of peace, 
of those whose special object is to promote relations of harmony 
between nation and nation, such as treaties of amity, of alliance, and 
other acts of the same nature having a political character.”64 Cecil Hurst 
noted in 1922, “In general . . . treaties between the belligerents 
concluded with a political object are abrogated by war.”65 
In 1929, the Supreme Court used similar “political character” 
language to describe which agreements would be inconsistent with war: 
The law of the subject is still in the making, and, in attempting to 
formulate principles at all approaching generality, courts must 
proceed with a good deal of caution. But there seems to be fairly 
common agreement that at least the following treaty obligations 
remain in force: stipulations in respect of what shall be done in a 
state of war; treaties of cession, boundary, and the like; provisions 
giving the right to citizens or subjects of one of the high contracting 
powers to continue to hold and transmit land in the territory of the 
other; and, generally, provisions which represent completed acts. On 
the other hand, treaties of amity, of alliance, and the like, having a 
political character, the object of which is to promote relations of 
harmony between nation and nation, are generally regarded as 
belonging to the class of treaty stipulations that are absolutely 
annulled by war.66 
Later cases67 and the ALI’s 1987 Restatement of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States68 follow Techt and Karnuth as the 
latest word on the wartime treaty-suspension rule. 
States’ powers under the Constitution presuppose friendship and 
amity between states and the Union. Whatever difficulties exist in 
classifying wartime-suspended versus wartime-operational agreements, 
 
 63.  Id. at 242. 
 64.  J.B. Moore, The Effect of War on Public Debts and on Treaties—The Case of the Spanish 
Indemnity, 1 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 220 (1901) (translating and quoting “the great work of Calvo,” 
Droit Int., 4th ed., IV, 65, sec. I, noting that this rule was “universally accepted”). 
 65.  Cecil J. Hurst et al., The Effect of War on Treaties, 2 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 37, 42 (1922). 
 66.  Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231, 236–37 (1929) (citation omitted and emphasis 
added). 
 67.  See e.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508 (1947) (“There may of course be such an 
incompatibility between a particular treaty provision and the maintenance of a state of war as to 
make clear that it should not be enforced.”). 
 68.  RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, THIRD, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 336, reporters’ note 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (noting Techt, Karnuth, and Clark). 
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States’ political powers in the federal government in Articles I, II, and 
V are an easy case: they are inconsistent with a state of war, and hence 
are suspended. 
In 1969, Article 73 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
shelved the question of wartime treaty suspension.69 In 2011, however, 
the International Law Commission submitted draft articles to the 
United Nations General Assembly on the issue. The proposal follows 
cases like Karnuth and Techt in holding that war is incompatible with 
“political” agreements.70 Proposed Article 7 refers to an appendix 
listing several sorts of agreements which may “continue in operation, 
in whole or in part, during armed conflict.”71 Among these are 
agreements establishing international organizations,72 which are close 
analogues to the Constitution’s establishment of the federal 
government. Such organizations can continue to operate during armed 
conflict, but “the continued participation of its members in the 
activities of the international organization” may, in some cases, be 
suspended.73 While it does not squarely resolve the issue posed during 
the Civil War, these comments on the power to participate in 
international organizations come the closest to framing the issue at 
stake during the Civil War. The framing suggests that current 
international law commentators recognize that the rationale of the rule 
regarding the watime suspension of friendship-presupposing 
agreements would apply to the participation of states in  the federal 
government. 
There is no principled distinction that prevents the tacit-
supposition-of-peace principle from applying to states’ powers under 
the Constitution. Tacit quantifier domain restriction is a general 
phenomenon of language, and is not limited to agreements like treaties 
between full nation states. If a peacetime-presupposition interpretive 
convention applies to private contracts, treaties, statutes, and 
regulations, it naturally applies to constitutions too. This does not mean 
that the Constitution has no force during a war. Vattel and those 
following him were perfectly aware that many treaty provisions do 
contemplate war without presupposing continued amity and friendship 
 
 69.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 73, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 
I.L.M. 679 (1969) (refusing to “prejudge” issue). 
 70.  Report from the United Nations, Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on 
Treaties, with Commentaries 7–8 nn.395–96 (2011), goo.gl/FkpUON. 
 71.  Id. at 21. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 37 (noting the draft would not “prejudice” the issue). 
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between the contracting parties.  The Constitution likewise 
contemplates war in distributing war powers among Congress,74 the 
President,75 and the States,76 limiting habeas suspension to “Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion,”77 and distinguishing between the rules for 
“time of peace” and “time of war.”78 But it does not contemplate war 
by states against the federal government. Ex Parte Milligan, for instance, 
rightly struck down the use of military commissions to try cases in 
locations where courts are operating: 
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, 
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its 
protection all classes of men, at all times and under all 
circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences 
was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions 
can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of 
government.79 
The suspension of states’ powers while they engage in illegal war is 
not based on a general suspension of the Constitution during war; it is 
limited only to relationships between the parties at war with each other. 
Lambdin Milligan could not himself be presumed to be at war with the 
federal government prior to adjudication; his constitutional rights were 
not suspended. But states that had formally passed resolutions of 
secession were at war with the Union; as the Court noted just three 
years later, their constitutional rights and powers were suspended. 
C. Was the Rebellion Confined to Individuals, Not States Themselves? 
Perhaps, though, the states were not actually in rebellion. When 
Mississippi said that its ties with the Union were dissolved, if secession 
was illegal, those ties were not actually dissolved. However, Mississippi 
did engage in war against the Union, and that is enough for suspension 
of its constitutional rights. 
Harrison has suggested in conversation that Articles I and V are 
different because Article I powers require the existence of a lawful 
apparatus of officials to operate, but Article V naysaying powers do not. 
A group of legislators, or perhaps even a state legislature itself, can 
become disloyal by passing an ordinance of secession, and so rendering 
 
 74.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11–16. 
 75.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 76.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 77.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
 78.  U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
 79.  71 U.S. (2 Wall.) 2, 120–21 (1866). 
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a state unable to exercise Article I or positive Article V powers. But, 
Harrison argues, a state itself cannot be disloyal, because if secession is 
illegal, there is no such thing as a disloyal, rebel state. Thus, the story 
would go, Southern states still possessed both Article I and Article V 
rights, but were simply unable to exercise Article I and Article V “yes” 
powers, for lack of lawfully-appointed legislatures. The Article V “no” 
power, however, requires no officials. 
This disanalogy is uncompelling; it is no more incongruous to label 
states “rebel states,” and yet still states in the Union, subject to the 
federal government’s authority, than to label individual Americans 
“rebels,” and yet still Americans subject to the federal government’s 
authority. States act through their duly-authorized agents; qui facit per 
alium, facit per se (he who acts through another acts himself). It is no 
more impossible for a state to rebel than for a corporation to commit a 
crime.80 “If . . . the invisible, intangible essence or air which we term a 
corporation can level mountains, fill up valleys, lay down iron tracks, 
and run railroad cars on them, it can intend to do it, and can act therein 
as well viciously as virtuously.”81 
The idea that states themselves, by their nature, cannot rebel or be 
guilty of disloyalty is wrong for the same reason as the idea—“the old 
and exploded doctrine,” the Supreme Court called it in 190982—that 
corporations can never commit crimes. The chief reason to adopt those 
conclusions uses the ipso facto ultra vires fallacy, a close cousin of the 
“no true Scotsman” fallacy: if an apparent state actor rebels, he must 
not really be acting on behalf of the state, but must be, in virtue of his 
rebellion, merely on a frolic of his own.83 No true agent of the state 
would rebel; no true corporate employee would commit a crime. 
 
 80.  See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson. R. R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492–93 (1909) 
(recognizing that corporations could commit crimes despite the common law doctrine claiming 
that they could not). See Christopher R. Green, Theseus, Incorporated: Philosophy of Mind, 
Material Constitution, and the Ontology of the Criminal Law, for my philosophical defense, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1949507. See Christopher R. Green, Punishing Corporations: 
The Food-Chain Schizophrenia in Punitive Damages and Criminal Law, 87 NEB. L. REV. 197 
(2008) for a survey of the unanimity among the states, both in criminal law and punitive damages, 
that corporations may properly be punished. 
 81.  N.Y. Cent. & Hudson, 212 U.S. at 493 (quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW UPON A NEW SYSTEM OF LEGAL EXPOSITION 255–56 
(§ 417) (8th ed. 1892)). 
 82.  Id. at 496. 
 83.  See, e.g., Orr v. Bank of United States, 1 Ohio 36, 41 (1822) (“Trespass does not lie 
against a corporation, viz: by the name of corporation, but against the persons who did it, by their 
proper name . . . . As outlawry does not lie against an aggregate corporation, therefore trespass 
does not lie against them . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
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Definitions of “state” or “corporate action” that simply exclude certain 
state or corporate actions a priori as impossible are not likely to be 
useful legally. 
It is true that the Supreme Court in the Prize Cases held that 
Congress “cannot declare war against a state” and that the President 
may not “initiate or declare a war . . . against a . . . State.”84 But this is 
not because the states may not initiate war with the Union, for in the 
next breath the Court calls the Confederate states “states in 
rebellion.”85 The states obviously rebelled through their secession 
conventions. The Court noted the consensus six years later: “All admit 
that, during this condition of civil war, the rights of the State as a 
member, and of her people as citizens of the Union, were suspended.”86 
The Prize Cases Court did not establish any sort of principle that 
secession stained only individuals and not states; secession affected the 
rights of both. 
III. END-OF-WAR LAW: VICTORS’ POWER TO DELAY A CONDITION 
OF PEACE 
If language has tacit restrictions on its coverage, and if one of those 
tacit restrictions is that friendship-presupposing agreements between 
are suspended “during wartime,” who decides how long that lasts? The 
answer is, under well-established, uncontroversial armed-conflict law, 
as long as the victor deems it necessary to be secure in its victory.  
Standard jus post bellum and jus victoriae rules of armed-conflict law 
give victors a broad right to impose conditions before restoring the 
legal status quo ante. 
A. History and Philosophy 
In 1532, Francisco de Vitoria first described the right of those 
fighting in a just war to go beyond the specific object of the war to 
establish peace: 
[A] prince may . . . in a just war and do whatever is necessary in order 
to obtain peace and security from the enemy; for example, destroy 
an enemy’s fortress and even build one on enemy soil, if this be 
necessary in order to avert a dangerous attack of the enemy. This is 
proved by the fact that, as said above, the end and aim of war is 
 
 84.  Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black.) 635, 668 (1863). 
 85.  Id. at 671. 
 86.  Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 727 (1869); see also infra notes 132, 133 and 
accompanying text. 
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peace and security. Therefore a belligerent may do everything 
requisite to obtain peace and security.87 
Vitoria also approved using war to avenge wrong, a much more 
controversial point. But it was uncontroversial that those fighting a just 
war may properly demand security and freedom from risk regarding 
the object of the war, beyond bare attainment of the object itself.88 
In 1625, Hugo Grotius also noted the victor’s right to “security”: 
“[A]s far as his own Security will permit it, it is honourable (to a 
Conqueror) to shew Clemency and Liberality.”89 This fits with his 
general comment that in self-defense, “[I may] invade and seize upon 
what belongs to another” and “detain it till my Security be sufficiently 
provided for.”90 Samuel Pufendorf repeated the same idea in 1673: 
“Humanity commands me, as far as the Fury of War will permit, that I 
do my Enemy no more Harm, than the Defence or Vindication of my 
Right requires, with Care to my Security for the Time to come.”91 Jean 
Barbeyrac explained in a 1724 note on Grotius, 
[T]he Victor, who has possessed himself of an Enemy’s Country, 
may command in it, whilst he holds it, and not resign it, till he has 
good Security, that he shall either obtain, or possess without Hazard, 
what is necessary for the Satisfaction and Amends he has a Right to 
exact by the Methods of Force.92 
In 1758, Vattel gave the general understanding at the time of the 
immediate background to the Constitution: 
When a sovereign has been compelled to take up arms for just and 
important reasons, he may carry on the operations of war till he has 
attained its lawful end, which is, to procure justice and safety . . . . [I]f 
we have to do with a perfidious enemy, it would be imprudent to 
trust either his words or his oaths. In such case, justice allows and 
prudence requires that we should avail ourselves of a successful war, 
and follow up our advantages, till we have humbled a dangerous and 
 
 87.  FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, ON THE LAW OF WAR § 18 (1532), reprinted in VITORIA: 
POLITICAL WRITINGS 305 (Anthony Padgen & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991) (emphasis added). 
 88.  See infra notes 89 to 100 and accompanying text. 
 89.  3 GROTIUS, supra note 50, at 1586 (§ 3.20.50.1) (emphasis added). 
 90.  Id., at 1186 (§ 3.1.2.2) (emphasis added). Grotius here cites his earlier comment that one 
fighting a just war may take even neutrals’ property as long as “he takes nothing but what is 
necessary for his Security.” 2 GROTIUS, supra note 50, at 437 (§ 2.2.10). 
 91.  SAMUEL PUFENDORF, THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN 240 (chapter 16) (Knud Haakonssen 
ed., 2003) (1673) (emphasis added). 
 92.  3 GROTIUS, supra note 50, at 1374 n.1 (§ 3.8.1.1) (note added in French edition by Jean 
Barbeyrac; see 1 id. at x). 
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excessive power, or compelled the enemy to give us sufficient 
security . . . .93 
Kant’s comments on the jus post bellum in his 1796 Science of Right 
(“Right after War,” he termed it94) are also instructive. He sets much 
stricter limits on transitioning from a state of war to one of peace than 
does Vitoria: neither punishment nor restitution of the cost of war is 
allowed.95 However, like earlier writers, Kant thinks those who win a 
just war are entitled to security against an unjust aggressor: “The 
conqueror lays down the conditions under which he will agree with the 
conquered power to form the conclusion of Peace.”96 Kant denies that 
a victor has “the right to partition and appropriate the country, so as to 
make a state as it were disappear from the earth.”97 He does, however, 
note that in giving security to the victor, the people may be required to 
“adopt such a new constitution as by its nature would be unfavourable 
to the inclination for war.”98 This is exactly what the North imposed on 
the South in 1867. Victory in a just war entitles the winner to get rid of 
risks and inclinations, not merely to repel an unjust act of aggression.99 
B. Reconstruction 
An armed-conflict winner’s need for at least some measures of 
security were generally acknowledged during Reconstruction. There 
was great dispute about how large these measures should be, but it was 
 
 93.  VATTEL, supra note 25, at 654 (4.1, § 6). 
 94.  IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT (§ 58) 137 (William Hastie 
trans.,1887) (1796). 
 95.  Id. at 137–38 (“Neither the conquered State nor its Subjects, lose their political liberty 
by conquest of the country, so as that the former should be degraded to a colony, or the latter to 
slaves; for otherwise it would have been a penal war, which is contradictory in itself.”); id. at 138 
(“Still less can Slavery be deduced as a rightful institution, from the conquest of a people in war; 
for this would assume that the war was of a punitive nature.”). 
 96.  Id. at 137. 
 97.  Id. at 139 (§ 60). Note the similarity between Kant’s resistance to a power to destroy the 
existence of a defeated foe and Jacob Howard’s position in February 1865 that Southern states 
must eventually be restored to their earlier position. STS, supra note 1, at 36 n.87 and 
accompanying text. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  I cannot resist including a fascinating tidbit about Kant’s jus post bellum discussion that 
touches on the legality of secession. In the next section after the comments just quoted, Kant 
proposes a “Permanent Congress of Nations” that could establish a “real state of Peace.” Id. at 
139 (§ 61) (emphasis added). Kant then makes a passing comment on the indissolubility of the 
American Union: “By such a Congress is here meant only a voluntary combination of different 
States that would be dissoluble at any time, and not such a union as is embodied in the United 
States of America, founded upon a political constitution, and therefore indissoluble.” Id. at 140 
(emphasis added). 
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generally well-understood that the losers of a war had no right to have 
their surrender taken unquestioningly at face value. Proffered 
surrenders had to be accepted, and by the proper authority. Article 156 
of the 1863 Lieber Code, for instance, noted that in receiving promises 
from surrendering soldiers or armies, a victor may decide “whether 
reliance can be placed upon such oaths.” Even those Southerners who 
thought that the Article VI oath was enough must have seen that only 
a sincere Article VI oath would do the job.  Such sincerity could only 
be judged, moreover, by some agent of the victorious North, rather than 
by surrendering former Confederates. Eric McKitrick’s comprehensive 
history of the conflict between the President and Congress noted the 
consensus: “[E]veryone, including President Johnson, understood . . . 
there had to be terms. The South would have to do things, and the North 
would have to say what they were.”100 
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction’s report rooted the delay 
in Southern representation squarely on the North’s jus post bellum 
rights. The Union could demand “adequate guarantees against future 
treason and rebellion”  and impose “such conditions as, in the opinion 
of Congress, the security of the country and its institutions may 
demand.”101 It was “madness and folly” to say that “conquered enemies 
have the right, and shall be permitted at their own pleasure and on their 
own terms, to participate in making laws for their conquerors.”102 
Former Confederates were “entitled only by public law to such rights, 
privileges, and conditions as might be vouchsafed by the conqueror.”103 
C. Law 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the general right of 
victors to demand further post-war security. For instance, in 1871, the 
Court upheld a law that tolled statutes of limitations during the war, 
even after the surrenders of 1865. The Court commented, “[T]he [war] 
power is not limited to victories in the field and the dispersion of the 
insurgent forces. It carries with it inherently the power to guard against 
the immediate renewal of the conflict and to remedy the evils which 
have arisen from its rise and progress.”104 This was not mere special 
 
 100.  ERIC L. MCKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 186 (1960); see also 
id. at 23 (summarizing the consensus from earlier writers like Grotius: “[T]he victor needs to be 
assured that . . . his objectives have been accomplished.”). 
 101.  REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION xx (1866). 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at xix. 
 104.  Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 507 (1871). 
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pleading during Reconstruction; cases after both World War I105 and 
World War II106 followed the same principle. The Court explained in 
1947, “The cessation of hostilities does not necessarily end the war 
power. . . . [T]he war power . . . is plainly adequate to deal with problems 
of law enforcement which arise during the period of hostilities, but do 
not cease with them.”107 Security for the victors is a standard, 
uncontroverted element of current jus post bellum law.108 To be secure 
in one’s victory is what it means to win a war, rather than to simply 
disperse opposing armies. The Fourteenth Amendment and 
Reconstruction Act are similar to demands regularly and legitimately 
made by victorious parties in armed conflict today: 
Modern peace agreements regularly contain a large regulatory 
component, including numerous provisions on the organization of 
public authority and individual rights, such as provisions on 
transitional government, claims mechanisms, human rights clauses, 
provisions on demobilization, disarmament and reintegration, as 
well as provisions on individual accountability.109 
Jus post bellum rules are a byproduct of the general need for the 
losers in a war to submit to the victors; therefore, they apply both to 
civil and international wars. As Jens David Ohlin recently remarked, 
Vattel coined the phrase “common law of war” to refer to “customary 
rules regarding warfare which applied during all armed conflicts—
whether they were classified as international or internal wars.”110 Stahn 
and Kleffner’s recent study of jus post bellum likewise makes clear that 
 
 105.  Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 161 (1919) (quoting same 
language from Stewart, “The power is not limited to victories in the field and the dispersion of the 
[insurgent] forces. It carries with it inherently the power to guard against the immediate renewal 
of the conflict, and to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress.”). 
 106.  Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 116 (1947) (following 
Stewart and Hamilton, “The cessation of hostilities does not necessarily end the war power. . . . 
that the war power includes the power to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and 
progress and continues during that emergency.”). 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  See generally JUS POST BELLUM: TOWARDS A LAW OF TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO 
PEACE (Carsten Stahn & Jann Kleffner eds., 2008) [hereinafter JPB]. 
 109.  Carsten Stahn, Jus post bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s), in JPB, supra note 108, at 
100. 
 110.  Jens David Ohlin, The Common Law of War, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 493, 499 (2016); 
see also id. at 518 (“[E]ven civil wars are governed by natural law through the common law of 
war”); id. at 518–19 (quoting the Prize Cases and Vattel, “[t]his being the case, it is very evident 
that the common laws of war—those maxims of humanity, moderation, and honour—ought to be 
observed by both parties in every civil war”). 
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the general problem of security for the victor applies both to civil and 
international armed conflict.111 
IV. THE SEPARATION OF WAR POWER 
Granted, then, that the victorious Union could delay Southern 
participation in the statutory and constitutional lawmaking processes 
until it thought it was safe, did the Union in fact do so? The first issue 
here is, who should count as “the Union”—the President or Congress? 
Secondly, did Congress act with enough clarity to suspend Article V 
powers, if it did not pass a resolution saying that the Amendment had 
been adopted with only loyal-state ratifications? I explain here why the 
war-declaration power puts Congress, not the President, in charge of 
end-of-wartime-suspension decisionmaking, and that Congress was not 
required to spell out the application to the Article V denominator in so 
many words. 
A. Congressional Power Over Wartime-Restriction Timing 
The first issue is the easier one: a congressional jus post bellum 
power to delay a condition of peace is the unavoidable corollary of a 
congressional jus ad bellum power to “declare War.”112 Even if the 
President has the power to repel sudden attacks or initiate hostilities, it 
is textually unavoidable that Congress can, on its own, “declare War.” 
Maybe the President can too,113 but Congress has the power to declare 
that a state of war exists. And the jus post bellum power is simply this 
power set in a time frame: the power to say that a state of war still exists. 
Even if, for whatever reason, the condition of hostility does not amount 
to a “war,” congressional power to call forth the militia to “suppress 
Insurrections”114 entails a power to set the criteria for when an 
insurrection exists. If Congress says one exists, it does, and if Congress 
says one still exists, it still does. 
 
 111.  See Andre Nollkaemper & Nico Schrijver, JPB, supra note 108, at v (“[T]he concept of 
jus post bellum . . . has an established background in just war doctrine. But it has significant 
potential in its application to the situation following modern armed conflicts, irrespective whether 
of an interstate or intrastate nature.”); Stahn, supra note 109, at 106 (“A jus post bellum would 
have to apply in the aftermath of civil wars.”). 
 112.  U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 11. 
 113.  Michael D. Ramsey, The Textual Limit on the President’s War Powers, NAT’L 
CONSTITUTION CTR., https://goo.gl/TWpXFr (noting, though, there is a “widespread consensus 
that the Declare War Clause limits the President’s power to initiate the use of military force”). 
 114.  U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 15. 
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Vattel, in considering how the law of war might apply in different 
countries, noted this point: as a matter of logic and domestic law, the 
power to delay the end of a war is in the same hands as the power to 
begin a war. The power to “judge of the causes and reasons for which 
war is to be undertaken” entails the power “to point out the time when 
it shall be discontinued.”115 Grotius agreed: “They who have Power to 
begin a War, have likewise Power to enter upon a Treaty to finish it.”116 
If the president has an independent power to decide that a state of war 
exists—perhaps because we have been suddenly attacked—he may also 
have the power to decide that such a condition persists. But whatever 
the President’s powers, Congress certainly has the power to declare that 
the conditions of wartime still exist. Without congressional 
acquiescence, the president cannot—as Andrew Johnson hoped—
declare that the war is definitively over. 
A treaty might also end a war, and so (two thirds of) the Senate 
together with the President could cut the House out of the peace-
delaying process.117 Once peace had been re-established, Congress 
could declare a new war, but it could not continue the old one; its power 
would thus be subject to the jus ad bellum (the rules relating to going 
to war), not the jus post bellum (those relating to ending a war). No 
such treaty, though, ever ended the Civil War. 
President Johnson did declare on August 20, 1866, that “the said 
insurrection is at an end and that peace, order, tranquility, and civil 
authority now exist in and throughout the whole of the United States 
of America.”118 He claimed that because peace was re-established, 
“that such constituent States must necessarily be, and by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States are made equals, and placed 
upon a like footing as to political rights, immunities, dignity and power 
with the several States with which they are united.”119 Congress, 
however, disagreed, and its war-status-declaration power trumps the 
President’s. One way to see the distinction is to use J.L. Austin’s 
terminology: the congressional power to declare war is, like the power 
to say “with this ring I thee wed,” or “I hereby promise,” a 
performative use of language. Unlike most statements about reality, for 
 
 115.  VATTEL, supra note 25, at 655 (4.2, § 10). 
 116.  3 GROTIUS, supra note 50, at 1551 (§ 3.20.2). 
 117.  U.S. CONST. art. II § 2 cl. 2 (stating presidential power to “make Treaties, provided two 
thirds of the Senators present concur”). 
 118.  Andrew Johnson, Proclamation No. 4, 14 Stat. 814, 817 (August 20, 1866). 
 119.  Id. at 816. 
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Congress to simply say that a state of war exists is for Congress to make 
such a state of war exist (if it did not already). Presidential statements 
about peace and war, by contrast, are statements about an 
independently-existing reality, not constitutive elements of that reality 
itself: Austin would call them “constantive” uses of language.120 
The only early source explicitly considering the extent of 
congressional and presidential powers to end wartime suspensions, 
William Rawle, makes clear that the President cannot restore rights 
suspended by war on his own. Rawle noted  in 1825 that a presidential 
truce, though it could for the time being terminate “hostilities,” cannot 
“revive treaties which were broken by the commencement of the war, 
or restore rights of any sort, which were suspended by it.”121 Rawle’s 
brief comment encapsulates almost the entire loyal-denominator 
argument: wartime agreement-suspension, the jus post bellum 
distinction between ending hostility and establishing peace, and the 
lack of presidential power outside the context of a treaty to exercise jus 
post bellum power. 
B. Did Congress Pull the Trigger? 
In addition to his arguments discussed above,122 Harrison has urged 
that Congress did not “pull the trigger.” He elaborates: 
Although the reduced denominator theory has merits, it is also 
subject to doubt. While many Republicans endorsed it to varying 
degrees, they still did not pull the trigger and proclaim the 
Fourteenth Amendment ratified by three-fourths of the represented 
states. Instead, they waited until three-fourths of all the states had, 
in their view at least, agreed to the Amendment. It seems that they 
were not prepared to try the more aggressive theory unless they 
absolutely had to.123 
Harrison is right about the uneasiness of several Republicans; as 
documented at length in the companion to this Article, a few significant 
Republicans, most prominently Lincoln in his last public address and 
Senators John Sherman, Oliver Morton, and George Edmunds, 
 
 120.  J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 25 (J. O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà eds., 
2d ed. 1962) (performative utterance defined “as not, or not merely, saying something, but doing 
something, and as not a true or false report of something”); id. at 3 (“true or false statements” 
deemed “constative”). 
 121.  WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 110 (2d ed. 1829). 
 122.  See supra notes 11, 29, 32, and 34 and accompanying text. 
 123.  Harrison, supra note 5, at 422 (emphasis added). 
GREEN 12.8.17 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/18/2017  2:46 PM 
2017] LOYAL DENOMINATORISM AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 193 
professed agnosticism about the size of the Article V denominator, 
though many more Republicans explicitly advocated a loyal 
denominator.124 Agnosticism is only the rejection of a loyal 
denominator if a loyal denominator required specific Congressional 
action. But Congress had no special power to “proclaim the Fourteenth 
Amendment ratified.” There was no trigger to pull. 
Article V is clear on the timing of new amendments, and Congress 
is simply not involved: proposals “shall be valid to all Intents and 
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified . . . .”125 
Congressional power to say that the Amendment was ratified, like the 
President’s power to say that the nation was now at peace, is not the 
power to make it so.126 As Michael Stokes Paulsen puts it, “nothing in 
the text of Article V remotely suggests . . . a substantive commitment” 
of amendment-validity issues to Congress.127 Neither Congress in July 
1868, nor Secretary of State Seward in his proclamations about the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, claimed the right to 
conclusively resolve the ratification-legitimacy issue for everyone.128 
Three days after the loyal-denominator threshold was passed, Reverdy 
Johnson rightly told Republicans who were considering a resolution 
declaring the Fourteenth Amendment to already be the law that others 
might disagree with it: 
When will the Constitution be amended by the ratification of three 
fourths of those States that are represented? Who is to decide that? 
 
 124.  See STS, supra note 1, at 37 n.95, 62 nn.236–38 and accompanying text. 
 125.  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 126.  See J.L. Austin, supra note 120 (defining performative utterance “as not, or not merely, 
saying something, but doing something, and as not a true or false report of something”). 
 127.  Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of 
the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 707 (1993). Paulsen compellingly takes down 
the contrary reasoning of two separate opinions in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)—Chief 
Justice Hughes’s statement that Congress has “control over the promulgation of the adoption of 
the amendment,” id. at 450, and Justice Black’s view that “Congress has sole and complete control 
over the amending process,” id. at 459. Paulsen also notes that many earlier cases had adjudicated 
challenges to amendments without taking Congress’s word on the issue as in any way binding; see 
id. at 712 n.123 (citing United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931) (answering an attack on 18th 
Amendment); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) (answering an attack on 19th Amendment); 
National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920) (answering an attack on 18th Amendment); 
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 231 (1920) (answering an attack on 19th Amendment); Hawke v. Smith, 
253 U.S. 221 (1920) (answering attack on 18th Amendment); and Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. 
(3 Dall.) 378 (1798) (answering an attack on 11th Amendment). 
 128.  Paulsen, supra note 127, at 712 (“[I]f the views of Seward and Congress in 1868 count as 
precedent, they should be precedent as to the merits of the specific issues there addressed, not for 
the proposition that the decision is committed to the political branches—still less to Congress in 
particular. Neither Congress in its proclamations nor Seward in his made any such grandiose 
assertion.”). 
GREEN 12.8.17 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/18/2017  2:46 PM 
194 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 13:1 
That is an open question, and must be an open question just as much 
after you have declared that it is to be a part of the Constitution 
when ratified by three fourths as if you leave it blank. If in point of 
law the States that are now represented are the States to whom it is 
to be referred and by whom is to be ratified the constitutional 
amendment proposed by Congress, then the Constitution of the 
United States will be altered in that respect; but if it is to be 
submitted to more than the States that are represented in Congress, 
that is to say, to all the States, the question will be open whether 
Congress declares it or not . . . .129 
In short, Congress did not have the power, simply by saying so, to 
alter the Article V denominator, either to make it smaller or to make it 
larger. Congress had the power under the war-declaration130 and 
insurrection-suppression131 powers to recognize the continuing hostility 
of the South, and a reduced Article V denominator followed from that 
recognition. There is no separate amendment-recognizing power, 
however, that Congress failed to deploy—no critical un-pulled trigger. 
Further, cases after the war that consider whether particular rights 
of Confederate states were suspended during the war do not consider 
whether Congress specifically declared those particular rights to be 
suspended. Texas v. White held in 1869 that the right to sell bonds was 
suspended,132 while White v. Hart held in 1872 that the duty not to 
impair the obligation of contracts was not suspended.133 Suspension of 
rights followed as a matter of law from the (congressionally-
recognized) state of war itself. 
Congress was clear in both July 1866 and March 1867 that, as far as 
it was concerned, the South was still in a state of hostility, and that it 
was exercising the Union’s jus post bellum/jus victoriae rights to delay 
a legally-operative state of peace. In the statute readmitting Tennessee 
in 1866, Congress declared that a “State government can only be 
restored to its former political relations in the Union by the consent of 
the law-making power of the United States.”134 “Political relations in 
the Union” is a broader concept than simply “representation in 
 
 129.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1393 (February 15, 1867) (emphasis added). 
 130.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 131.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
 132.  Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 727 (1869); see also Thomas v. Richmond, 79 U.S. 
(12 Wall.) 349, 357 (1871); Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 342, 345 (1871). 
 133.  White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646, 651 (1872); see also Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 
Wall.) 610, 623 (1873); Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454, 461 (1878). 
 134.  Joint Resolution Restoring Tennessee to her Relations to the Union, 14 Stat. 364 (1866). 
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Congress,” and includes articles I, II, and V.135 The statute concluded, 
“the State of Tennessee is hereby restored to her former proper, 
practical relations to the Union, and is again entitled to be represented 
by senators and representatives in Congress.”136 Congress thereby 
declared that peace under the law was re-established between the 
Union and Tennessee. But Congress’s explicit insistence on affirmative 
congressional consent, plus silence regarding other states, made clear 
that a legal peace was re-established only in Tennessee. 
The Reconstruction Act of March 1867 also made this clear: the 
governments of the “rebel States” were “provisional only, and in all 
respects subject to the paramount authority of the United States at any 
time to abolish, modify, control, or supersede the same.”137 By making 
it very plain that the South was still under wartime legal disabilities, 
Congress pulled the still-at-war-declaration trigger quite 
straightforwardly. Johnson’s veto of the Reconstruction Act also makes 
clear the hinge on which the legitimacy turned: whether 1867 should be 
deemed “a time of peace.”138 In the Reconstruction Act, Congress—the 
branch with explicit power to decide the division between wartime and 
peacetime—said no. 
Finally, even if, as Amar contends,139 the process of reconstruction 
during 1867 and 1868 is construed as genuine Southern part-authorship 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, coercion in that process must be 
evaluated against the baseline of what Congress would have been 
allowed to do legally. Congress told states that they would only be 
admitted to Congress if they agreed to the Fourteenth Amendment.140 
As explained below, this is rightly seen as impairing the pretension of 
free, unforced “reflection and choice” in our processes of constitutional 
adoption that Americans have made since the Founding. But if 
Congress had the power to declare the Fourteenth Amendment law 
under a loyal-denominator theory, then the threatened alternative was 
no worse (on this score) than what Congress asked former 
 
 135.  See id. 
 136.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 137.  An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States, 14 Stat. 428, 
429 § 6 (1867). 
 138.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1730 (1867). 
 139.  See AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 87 (2012) (“[Congress] ultimately opted to include ex-Confederate 
states in the amendment process.”). 
 140.  See 14 Stat. at 429 § 5 (An act responding to the difficulties of loyalists trying to vote, 
that provided that military authorities conduct elections for the state constitutional convention 
pursuant to basic reconstruction laws). 
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Confederates to do themselves. As Mitch Berman has noted, a 
relatively stable scholarly consensus has emerged around the idea that 
“a conditional proposal is coercive if it would be wrongful for the 
maker to do as it threatens.”141 Under that theory, resolving the 
lawfulness of hypothetical Congressional action actually imposing a 
loyal denominator is essential to deciding whether the invitation to the 
South to ratify “on its own” was improperly coercive. A far cleaner 
interpretation of Congress’s action was simply that the Fourteenth 
Amendment actually was the law, so that the Reconstruction Act 
should not be seen as a conditional threat at all. But even if the 
Reconstruction Act was a conditional threat, it avoids improper 
coercion only if the loyal-denominator theory could have been proper. 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
Aside from any change to the constitutional author, loyal 
denominatorism can also help lay to rest any embarrassment with the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s provenance that might otherwise hinder its 
energetic enforcement. This Section briefly considers four other 
implications of seeing the Fourteenth Amendment as authored only by 
the loyal North. The change is important both for our understanding of 
the nature of the Constitution’s status as an act of self-government and 
for our understanding of how the Constitution should be interpreted. 
A. Avoiding Ackerman, Amar, Colby, and Harrison’s Lessons: 
Preserving Government by “Reflection and Choice” 
Loyal denominatorism can rebut the practical implications of 
alternative theories: that is, help resist Ackerman’s non-Article-V 
amendment power, Harrison’s hyperformalism, Amar’s general federal 
power over state suffrage rules, and Colby’s non-originalism.142  The 
victorious, loyal North reflected, free of coercion, on whether to adopt 
the Fourteenth Amendment; it was a product of federally-structured 
“reflection and choice” rather than “accident and force,” in Hamilton’s 
words.143 
 
 141.  See Mitchel N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study in 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1347 (2013) (“Normative theorists have 
coalesced around [this view].”). 
 142.  See supra notes 3–8, and accompanying text; STS, supra note 1, at 16–17 nn.22–25 and 
accompanying text. 
 143.  Hamilton et al., supra note 24, at 1 (“It has been frequently remarked that it seems to 
have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the 
important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good 
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Excluding the South from constitutional co-authorship while it was 
subject to the Reconstruction Act thus improves the legitimacy and 
integrity of the constitutional author. States subject to total federal 
control in section 6 of the Reconstruction Act,144 as well as the martial 
law in sections 1 through 4, are not the free agents who can legitimately 
be taken to be authors of a Constitution based on “reflection and 
choice” rather than “force.” Blackstone explained property 
requirements for suffrage in terms of subjecting the poor to others’ 
wills: 
The true reason of requiring any qualification, with regard to 
property, in voters, is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a 
situation that they are esteemed to have no will of their own. . . . Only 
such are entirely excluded [from the suffrage], as can have no will of 
their own: there is hardly a free agent to be found, but what is 
entitled to vote in some place or other in the kingdom.145 
Thus, suffrage entails freedom, and the “provisional only” 
governments of the South were not free. Loyal denominatorism, on the 
other hand, justifies the Reconstruction Act’s imposition of Fourteenth 
Amendment on the South very simply: the Fourteenth Amendment 
was already the law, not an act in which Congress was inviting the South 
to participate as a forced co-author. If the South was an unwilling co-
author, the Fourteenth Amendment becomes a partly insincere act of 
capitulation, rather than a legitimate demand. Unqualified legitimacy 
for the Amendment requires a genuine expression of sovereign will. 
But as Blackstone explains, such a genuine expression requires 
unqualified freedom in its author, and only the North possessed such 
freedom during Reconstruction. If coerced ratifications are the only 
possible justification for the Fourteenth Amendment, we might have to 
accept them,146 but loyal denominatorism offers another way. 
 
government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their 
political constitutions on accident and force.”). For the federally-structured aspect, see id. at 196 
(Madison in Federalist 39) and infra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 144.  14 Stat. at 429 (“[U]ntil the people of said rebel States shall be by law admitted to 
representation in the Congress of the United States,” Southern government “shall be deemed 
provisional only, and in all respects subject to the paramount authority of the United States to 
abolish, modify, control, or supersede the same” until their representatives are admitted to 
Congress). 
 145.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES  *170 (emphasis added). 
 146.  See Harrison, supra note 5, at 457 (arguing that former-Confederate ratifications may 
have been coerced, but that under principles of international law, this does not invalidate the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
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B. Jus post bellum, Southern Intransigence, and Lessons for 
Democratic Theory 
Reorienting our understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
see that it became law before the Reconstruction Act, rather than 
because of it, does not eliminate the Act’s coercion of the South. 
However, a jus post bellum frame better justifies such coercion. Amar147 
and Ackerman148 are right to this extent: it is wrong to see the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment as the expression of “equal 
sovereignty,” an idea the Court invoked incessantly in Shelby County v. 
Holder.149 Justice Black’s dissent in South Carolina v. Katzenbach 
accused Congress of treating the South in the Voting Rights Act as 
“little more than conquered provinces.”150 Rather than shying away 
from the charge, we should see Southern resistance to the principles of 
the Fourteenth Amendment (and the Fifteenth Amendment) as exactly 
the same sort of struggle that appears in every jus post bellum problem 
following armed conflict.151 The South is more than a set of conquered 
provinces, but it is not less. This is not to say that jus post bellum 
problems have easy solutions. Instead, we must be patient and 
persevering in pressing for the enforcement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s principles despite Southern recalcitrance. 
A stress on the coercion of the South involved in the Fourteenth 
Amendment and seeing jus post bellum principles as its justification 
might, however, be seen to make its troubles from the standpoint of 
democratic legitimacy even worse. If the northern-denominator 
Fourteenth Amendment is the act only of the North and not the whole 
nation, is it really an exercise in self-government of the sort our 
Constitution claims to be? The self-government question raises the 
issues with which Colby’s consideration of the Fourteenth Amendment 
is chiefly concerned. His assessment of the Fourteenth Amendment 
focuses chiefly on the question of democratic pedigree, as opposed to 
 
 147.  See Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5, supra note 7, at 109. 
 148.  See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 403–04 
(President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2014) (criticizing Shelby County’s use of precedent, 
especially Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869), which held that actions taken by Texas in 
support of the rebellion, such as the sale of bonds, were null and void). 
 149.  See generally Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013). References to “equal 
sovereignty” appear on almost every page of the relatively-short opinion. See id. at 2618, 2621, 
2622, 2623, 2624, and 2630. Note the similarity to President Johnson’s view of the South. Cf. supra 
note 119 and accompanying text. 
 150.  South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 360 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 151.  See generally JPB, supra note 108 (reflecting on jus post bellum and the dynamic 
processes and structures involved in moving from conflict to peace). 
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legal legitimacy as such. His chief objection to the loyal denominator 
lies not in technical issues regarding the interpretation of “three fourths 
of the several States” in Article V, but on whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment can be seen as a genuine exercise of popular sovereignty. 
His democratic argument against the loyal denominator on that basis 
is very simple: “One cannot demonstrate that a constitutional 
amendment reflects a supermajoritarian consensus among the people 
simply by excluding from the equation the people of the states that 
rejected it.”152 
The loyal denominator theory, however, does not exclude the 
Southern states from the constitutional author simply because they 
rejected the Fourteenth Amendment; the theory excludes them from 
the power of constitutional authorship because they illegally seceded. Is 
a secession-based definition of “the people,” then, democratically 
legitimate? Colby evidently thinks not. We should avoid 
overconfidence about the principles that govern democratic legitimacy, 
but that question can be paired with another: is the distinction between 
states and territories democratically legitimate? While most advocates 
of the loyal Article V denominator held that former Confederate states 
were still states, and not literally reduced to the status of territories, 
these advocates still repeatedly used territorial metaphors to describe 
the condition of the South.153 Those who venture out into the less-
populated parts of a country are still, one might think, part of “the 
 
 152.  Colby, supra note 8, at 1682. 
 153.  See STS, supra note 1, at 35 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 533, 554) 
(Senator Jacob Howard) (“[T]he United States . . . have the same power and authority over the 
conquered States . . . . as the nation itself would possess over foreign territory conquered in the 
same way . . . . [T]he power of the United States over a conquered State which has been in 
rebellion is the ordinary power of the conqueror over conquered territory.”); id. at 78 (citing 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 89) (Representative Ebon Ingersoll) (“The late rebel 
States are to all intents and purposes as much territories of the United States, subject to the 
exclusive control of Congress, as are the territories of Utah, New Mexico, Montana, or any other 
Territory belonging to the Government.”); id. at 83 (New York Times stating that the loyal 
denominator “implies the reduction of the now excluded States to something resembling a 
territorial condition.”), id. at 88 (citing New York Herald editorial, The Work Before the 
Reconstruction Committee—The Right Way to Do It, 2 (February 1, 1867)) (“The duty will then 
devolve upon Congress of proclaiming the amendment part and parcel of the Federal 
Constitution, the supreme law of the land, binding alike upon the inside and outside States and 
the Territories.”); id. at 93 (citing ISRAEL WARD ANDREWS, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 253-54 (1874)) (“A proposed Amendment to the Constitution is no more 
dependent on the assent of a State holding such relation to the nation, than upon that of a 
Territory.”); id. at 93 (citing J.W. BURGESS, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 1866-
1876 81 (1902)) (under the loyal-denominator view, “their [Southern states’] petition for 
admission or recognition as ‘States’ of the Union with the amended Constitution would imply 
their assent to the Amendment as well as to every other part of the Constitution”). 
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people,” but they are denied federal political authority until they 
achieve—and Congress allows—statehood. Is that legitimate? To prefer 
loyal states over once-rebellious ones now seeking readmission to the 
Union’s political structures is no less democratically legitimate than 
preferring states already in the Union over those seeking admission to 
those structures for the first time. 
The distinctively democratic legitimacy of a Northern-authored 
Fourteenth Amendment or a Constitution imposed by earlier states on 
later ones as the price of statehood depends on whether and how “the 
people” may be structured. James Madison referred to one type of 
structure as “the people” in Federalist 39: “[T]his assent and 
ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing 
one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States 
to which they respectively belong.”154 Reconstruction and the 
privileging of earlier states over territories impose another sort of 
structure on our popular sovereign. Those lying on one side of certain 
geographic, temporal, or domestic-insurrectionary boundaries, the 
story would go, legitimately have different powers than those on the 
other side. Established states have been around, loyally supporting the 
structures of the Union, longer than territorial entities; former 
Confederate states whose loyalty is subject to question are likewise 
properly seen as junior partners relative to states that stuck with the 
Union. 
These temporal metaphors suggest that secession means forfeiting 
seniority. That is, the relationships of North to South and States to 
Territories are strongly akin to the relationship of Generation 1 to 
Generation 2. The authority of those now dead to set rules for the living 
is itself a difficult problem for democratic theory, but a tripartite 
analogy—North : South :: Established States : Territories :: Generation 
1 : Generation 2—may help us think about all three problems. I will 
consider the analogy more fully in future work, but will give a brief 
sketch here. 
Importantly, the Constitution was not imposed on the South, or on 
Territories, or on prospective officials today, utterly without their 
consent. The South was told to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, as a 
pledge of loyalty,155 if they wanted to be represented in Congress. Those 
 
 154.  Hamilton et al., supra note 24, at 196. 
 155.  See STS, supra note 1, at 46 n.138 (listing a great many Republicans who construed 
Southern ratifications as pledges of loyalty, rather than as constitutional co-authorship). 
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in territories are told to agree to the Constitution if they want to be in 
the Union.156 The current generation is told (by Article VI’s oath 
requirement) to be bound to support the Constitution if they want to be 
officials.157 These acts of consent may not amount to the sort of self-
government that can legitimate Reconstruction, the lessened federal 
rights of those living in territories, or the intergenerationally-imposed 
Constitution in the eyes of our preferred democratic theory. But it 
might be possible to understand the obligations of those who have 
agreed to such impositions, even while we bracket the issue of the 
political principles that should govern the propriety of state-to-
territory, North-to-South, or intergenerational assertions of authority 
themselves. 
A first normative consideration is the “mind of the imposer” or 
animus imponentis tradition in oath interpretation, which governs the 
obligations of those taking oaths as conditions imposed by others.158 
Those oaths must be governed, the tradition says, according to the way 
its words would be understood by the one imposing the oath, rather 
than according to any possible mental reservations in the mind of the 
one agreeing to the oath (the “animus jurantis”). 
As applied to Reconstruction, the upshot would be that by taking 
the offer in the Reconstruction Acts and approving the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the South was agreeing to be bound, not by their own 
understandings of its language, but by that of the imposing power, the 
North. This is true even if the Reconstruction Acts breached some sorts 
of norms of democratic self-government. As applied to the 
intergenerational assertions of authority at stake in the dead hand 
problem, the result is a form of originalism that can sidestep the 
 
 156.  See, e.g., Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions 
Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 119, 119–20 (2004). 
 157.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, 
and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of 
the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support 
this Constitution . . . .”); see also AID v. All. for Open Soc’y, 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2335 (2013) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that citizens are free to hold political views contrary to that of the 
Constitution, such as communism or anarchism, but Article VI wisely imposes “affirmative 
ideological commitments prerequisite to assisting in the government’s work”). 
 158.  See, e.g., WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
111 (§ 3.2.16.6) (2002) (1785) (“As oaths are designed for the security of the imposer, it is manifest 
that they must be interpreted and performed in the sense in which the imposer intends them; 
otherwise, they afford no security to him.  And this is the meaning of the rule, ‘jurare in animum 
imponentis’. . . .”); id. at 119 (§ 3.2.21) (“The animus imponentis . . . is the measure of the juror’s 
[i.e., oath-swearer’s] duty. The inquiry, therefore, concerning subscription will be, quis imposuit, 
et quo animo? [Who imposed it, and with what intention?]”). 
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normative attacks of the dead hand. Even if the founders breached 
norms of self-government in requiring later generations to swear the 
Article VI oath, those who swear it are nonetheless bound to obey it as 
its text would be understood from the imposer’s perspective, i.e., 
according to its original meaning. 
A second source of insight is an analogy to the assertion of in rem 
jurisdiction by a court: authority over a thing, rather than authority 
over persons (i.e., in personam jurisdiction). Litigants who want to 
assert a claim in the thing must agree to abide by the court’s rulings, 
independent of any authority the court might otherwise have to issue 
judgments binding on those litigants; “all the world” is bound in virtue 
of the court’s control over the res.159 The theory of in rem jurisdiction, 
however, is that we can decide whether a court has authority over a 
particular thing without having to resolve, on the basis of otherwise-
applicable in personam personal-jurisdiction rules, whether the court 
would have authority over all of the particular people in the world who 
might claim an interest in the object. Authority over the object is 
enough. If the founding generation, or the North, or pre-existing states, 
are legitimately in control of the federal government, then they can 
exercise authority over that government in a way that will legitimately 
bind everyone in the world who wants to take part in it—later 
generations, the South, or those in territories seeking to become states. 
A third source of guidance is an analogy to the shrink-wrap 
contract. Under cases like ProCD v. Zeidenberg160 and Hill v. Gateway 
2000,161 purchasers who accept a license as part of the price of obtaining 
a product are bound by that license’s terms, even if the purchaser never 
reads it and there is therefore no “meeting of the minds” of the 
contracting parties. The contract written by the seller, and to which the 
buyer is given access, governs according to its terms, even though the 
 
 159.  See, e.g., Mankin v. Chandler, 16 F. Cas. 625, 626 (E.D. Va. 1823) (Marshall, J.) 
(“[W]here the process is to be served on the thing itself, and where the mere possession of the 
thing itself, by the service of the process and making proclamation, authorizes the court to decide 
upon it without notice to any individual whatever, it is a proceeding in rem, to which all the world 
are parties.”); Dulin v. McCaw, 20 S.E. 681, 684 (W.Va. 1894) (“A proceeding in rem is a judicial 
proceeding against the thing itself, which, terminating in a valid judgment, binds all the world.”). 
 160.  See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1448–49 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that Shrinkwrap 
licenses are enforceable as soon as the buyer tears the wrapping of the package, even if they are 
printed on the outside of the box). 
 161.  See Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147, 1148–49 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that in a 
situation where the terms of a product sent in a box to a buyer stated that they governed the sale, 
unless the item was returned within 30 days, bound the buyer who failed to return the product, 
because contracts do not need to be read to be effective, and those who fail to read the terms 
assume the risk of those terms being unfavorable). 
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seller is almost certainly the only one who has considered all of its 
language. The founders, the North, and existing states are entitled to 
shrink-wrap the federal government with the Article VI oath, binding 
anyone who wants access to it. 
Fourth, consider an analogy between the past and a foreign country. 
“The past is a different country; they do things differently there.”162 
“[E]ach new generation born is in effect an invasion of civilization by 
little barbarians, who must be civilized before it is too late.”163 Noah 
Webster claimed that intergenerational constitutional assertions of 
authority were as illegitimate as one nation telling another what to do: 
“[T]he very attempt to make perpetual constitutions, is the assumption 
of a right to control the opinions of future generations; and to legislate 
for those over whom we have as little authority as we have over a 
nation in Asia.”164 But if the past is a different country, then future 
generations of officials are immigrants, without any particular right to 
claim a share of past generations’ resources. If this analogy is right, then 
naturalization and Article VI oaths are on a moral par. 
This quick sketch makes a great many unstated and challengeable 
assumptions, but I hope to make them explicit and defend them in the 
future. In short, like Ackerman, Harrison, Amar, and Colby, I use the 
Fourteenth Amendment as my own favorable precedent. The 
imposition of the Fourteenth Amendment on a South was rightly seen 
by many of those favoring the loyal denominator as closely analogous 
to the imposition of the Constitution on new states formed out of the 
territories, which is itself closely analogous to the imposition of the 
Constitution on later generations. If this three-fold analogy is proper, 
and if we think the South was obliged to obey a Northern-authored 
Fourteenth Amendment, we can generalize the normative lesson. Like 
the former Confederates, new states and later generations were not 
given the chance to vote on the Constitution as it then stood; 
participation in the federal Union and taking offices governed by 
Article VI mean submitting to its Constitution on a take-it-or-leave-it 
 
 162.  L.P. HARTLEY, THE GO-BETWEEN 5 (1953). 
 163.  THOMAS SOWELL, A CONFLICT OF VISIONS: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF POLITICAL 
STRUGGLES 167 (2007). Others attribute the same idea to Hannah Arendt. E.g., Jonah Goldberg, 
Western Civilization and Other Fairy Tales, NATIONALREVIEW.COM, https://goo.gl/sDArf7 
(“Political theorist Hannah Arendt once said that, every generation, Western civilization is 
invaded by barbarians–we call them ‘children.’”). 
 164.  GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 379 (2d 
ed., 1983) (citing Giles Hickory (pseudonym for Noah Webster), On the Absurdity of a Bill of 
Rights, AMERICAN MAGAZINE (Dec. 1787)). 
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basis. Having taken the offer, however, the South, new states, and later 
generations swearing the Article VI oath are all obliged to obey the 
Constitution according to its terms, as those terms were understood by 
those in the Union before, imposing it on new entrants—i.e., as it was 
understood by the North, by earlier states, and by the founding 
generation. 
C. The Importance of Context in Interpretation 
A third implication of loyal denominatorism is a fuller appreciation 
of the role of larger linguistic context in supplying tacit limits to the 
scope of terms like “the several States” or “each State” in the 
Constitution. Facially, these texts seem to apply even during war, but 
context supplies an implicit peacetime limit. Jonathan Gienapp has 
recently complained that originalists’ interpretive method is “narrow 
and atomistic,” rather than appreciating the way in which “individual 
utterances earn their meaning based on how they fit into a linguistic 
whole.”165 The importance of context-sensitive tacit quantifier domain 
restrictions can serve as a partial antidote to the atomism and context-
insensitivity that Gienapp sees in originalism. Such atomism is not 
essential to originalism. Only the context in which a text is embedded 
tells us what domain it is intended to cover.166 
 
 165.  Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and Holism: Failures of Originalist Translation, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 935, 936 (2015) (“By failing to historicize the American Founding, their 
method of translation proceeds from the faulty premise that the Founding generation and we 
today occupy more or less the same linguistic world, an assumption that enables their translation 
to take a narrow and atomistic form. Accordingly, as a result of this failure to historicize, they fail 
to appreciate the holistic character of meaning—that individual utterances earn their meaning 
based on how they fit into a linguistic whole—and, accordingly, target the wrong object of 
interpretation, focusing on individual words and statements when they must first grasp the 
broader idioms from which those component parts issued.”). 
 166.  Gottlob Frege’s philosophy of language similarly stresses the need for larger linguistic 
context: “[I]t is only in the context of a proposition that words have any meaning.” GOTTLOB 
FREGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARITHMETIC 73 (§ 62) (Oxford, Blackwell ed. 1950) (1884) (the 
Grundlagen) (“Nur im Zusammenhang eines Satzes bedeuten die Wörter etwas.”); see also id. at 
71–72 (§ 60) (“[W]e ought always to keep before our eyes a complete proposition.  Only in a 
proposition have the words really a meaning.”); id. at 116 (§ 106) (“[W]e must never try to define 
the meaning of a word in isolation, but only as it is used in the context of a proposition.”). For 
Frege’s sense-reference distinction, see generally Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the 
Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555 (2006); Frege’s context principle is also 
worth attention from legal scholars. 
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D. Implications of Northern Authorship for the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Meaning 
Loyal denominatorism changes the constitutional author from the 
traditional entire 37-state nation to the rump 26 states taking part in the 
federal government in February 1867. Therefore, the text of the 
Amendment should be read through the lens of Northern views of 
equality, due process, and the privileges of citizens, not as if the 
Amendment was genuinely co-authored with the South. An English 
sentence today would be interpreted slightly differently if we thought 
it were written by someone in England or Australia rather than 
America, or by a committee with members spread out among different 
English-speaking countries. Analogously, we should focus on the 
resonance of the Fourteenth Amendment text with Northern legal 
ideas, not those that could span both North and South. To the extent 
they differ from their Southern counterparts, Northern notions of 
equality, civil liberty, and due process are the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
interpretive key. 167 
There are some reasons to think that the North and South spoke 
different legal languages during Reconstruction. 
First, the background principles and practices that informed the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of equality168 were very 
different in the North and the South. Brown v. Board of Education, for 
instance, shied away from historical grounds in part because of the 
history of segregated education—and lack of education—in the 
 
 167.  For a few Republicans who described the Fourteenth Amendment as the export of 
Northern civil liberties to the South, see, e.g., SPEECHES OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866: IN THE 
STATES OF OHIO, KENTUCKY AND INDIANA 20 (1866) (speech of Benjamin Butler, August 25) 
(stating that the Fourteenth Amendment demands “that any one shall walk in peace in South 
Carolina the same as a citizen of South Carolina can now walk in Massachusetts”); id. at 41 
(speech of Franz Sigel, September 27) (“There will be no peace, no prosperity, till every man, 
white or black—as I see here a black face before me—shall be as safe in this whole country, not 
only in the North, but in the South.”); American Gazette, September 28, 1866, quoted in EDWARD 
MCPHERSON, PROPOSED FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 23 (1868) 
(“[W]hat this amendment does secure is the right of northern men, white or black, to enjoy, in 
any southern State to which business or pleasure may take them, the same immunity from outrage 
that is afforded her in the free north.”). 
 168.  See generally Green, supra note 45 (arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
requires equal citizenship). The Supreme Court has housed this equality requirement in the Equal 
Protection Clause, but there is good reason to house it instead in the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, because “protection of the laws” was a well-understood term referring to literal protection 
from violence and the right to a remedy. See generally Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense 
of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Pre-Enactment History, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1 
(2008); Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Subsequent 
History and Application, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 219 (2009). 
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South.169  The history of segregation and education in the North, while 
far from exemplary, was very different,170 and this difference matters if 
the Fourteenth Amendment expressed Northern principles, rather than 
principles of the full nation. 
Second, to the extent that rights prevalent in the Union at the 
precise time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted have special 
claim to count as “privileges . . . of citizens of the United States,”171 it 
matters if the North alone was fully represented in the Union at the 
time. The continuously-loyal states and those of the former 
Confederacy had different traditions of civil liberty. Steven Calabresi 
and Sarah Agudo point out some regional differences in the privileges 
generally accorded to citizens in different regions of the country in 
1868.172 One particularly striking instance is the right to keep and bear 
arms. In incorporating the Second Amendment into the Fourteenth, 
McDonald v. Chicago relies on the fact that “a clear majority of the 
States in 1868”—22 of 37—recognized such rights in their 
constitutions.173 However, “protection of gun rights was particularly 
 
 169.  See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489, 489 n.4 (1954) (explaining 
some regional differences in education between the North and South, noting much slower 
development in South). 
 170.  See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. 
L. REV. 947, 962 (1995) (“[T]he first attacks on racially segregated education occurred at the state 
level, in both the South and the North. Developments in the two regions, however, were so 
different that they must be considered separately.”); id. at 977 (“The experience in the Northern 
states during the fifteen-year period after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment thus falls 
short of proving that school segregation was understood to violate the Amendment, but it is also 
inconsistent with the equally extreme view that the Amendment had no bearing on the issue . . . . 
As the implications of the new constitutional regime came to be more fully understood in the 
North, segregation eventually was prohibited, either by legislative or judicial action, in every 
state.”). 
 171.  See Josh Blackman & Ilya Shapiro, Opening Pandora’s Box? Privileges or Immunities, 
the Constitution in 2020, and Properly Incorporating the Second Amendment, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1, 8 (2010) (placing focus on “how privileges or immunities were understood in 1868”); id. 
at 70 (accepting my earlier characterization that such a view would “freeze the privileges of 
citizens of the United States in 1868 amber”); see also Christopher R. Green, McDonald v. 
Chicago, the Meaning-Application Distinction, and “Of” in the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
11 ENGAGE NO. 1, 24, 26 (Mar. 2010) (explaining different interpretations of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause). 
 172.  See Steven Calabresi & Sarah Agudo, Individual Rights under State Constitutions when 
the Fourteenth Amendment was Ratified in 1868: What Rights are Deeply Rooted in the American 
History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 29–30 (2008) (showing charts displaying regional 
trends for various constitutional rights, defining “South” as the former slave states minus 
Delaware). Of course, to produce data most relevant to my view of the Fourteenth Amendment 
author, the 1868 should be 1867, and “South” should be defined more narrowly (i.e., excluding 
Tennessee, Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland). 
 173.  McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 777 (2010) (relying on Calabresi & Agudo, supra 
note 172, at 50). 
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Southern as long ago as 1868.”174 Because 13 of the 15 states lacking 
state-constitutional rights to keep and bear arms were in the North 
(including Nebraska), the 22-to-15 majority slims down to 14-12 if only 
those states represented in Congress at the exact moment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption in February 1867 are considered 
(the majority shrinks further, to 14-13, if Nebraska, admitted on March 
1, 1867, is included too).175 There was therefore no national state-
constitutional consensus in favor of gun rights at the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s precise time of adoption. To be sure, I disagree with 
McDonald about whether the prevalence of rights at the time of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s creation is the critical consideration for what 
substantive rights are protected by the Amendment; I would take the 
44-of-50 ratio today, which Justice Scalia mentioned at the McDonald 
oral argument but which went unmentioned in the opinion, as much 
more important.176 But if we are to focus on the rights prevalent when 
the Amendment was adopted, we should focus on the states actually 
adopting it. 
Finally, Ryan Williams’s survey of the antebellum rise of substantive 
due process (a term he applies to vested-rights and general-law 
versions of due process, not merely the sort that flowered in Munn v. 
Illinois and Lochner v. New York) reveals significantly stronger support 
for the doctrine in the South, especially in the Carolinas.177 
 
 174.  Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 172, at 51. 
 175.  Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. & 
POL. 191 (2006) (listing 12 represented Northern states with no such rights in 1867, as well as 
Nebraska: California (no provision, id. at 194), Delaware (adopted in 1987, id. at 194), Iowa (no 
provision, id. at 196), Illinois (adopted in 1970, id. at 196), Maryland (no provision, id. at 197), 
Minnesota (no provision, id. at 198), Nebraska (adopted in 1988, id. at 199); New Hampshire 
(adopted in 1982, id. at 199), New Jersey (no provision, id. at 200), Nevada (adopted in 1982, id. 
at 199), New York (no provision, id. at 200), Wisconsin (adopted in 1998, id. at 204), and West 
Virginia (adopted in 1986, id. at 204). The other two states lacking state-constitutional rights to 
keep and bear arms in 1868, but having them today, were in the South: Louisiana (adopted in 
1879, id. at 197) and Virginia (adopted in 1971, id. at 204)). 
 176.  See Green, supra note 3, at 113–17. 
 177.  Ryan Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 
462–63 (2010) (noting that of the first 14 states to embrace vested-rights and law-of-general-
applicability readings of due-process or law-of-the-land provisions, 8 were among the 11 states of 
the Confederacy, including Tennessee); id. at 469 (counting 6 more loyal states by 1868). 
Williams’s ratio therefore declines somewhat, from 20 out of 37 to 13 out of 26. Williams’s work 
shows that the vested-rights and law-of-general-applicability traditions were much shallower in 
the North. 
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CONCLUSION 
Seen as the product of a Northern author, the Fourteenth 
Amendment will be interpreted differently than it would if read as a 
North-South compromise: the concepts of due process, the privileges of 
citizenship, and equality were part of both Northern and Southern legal 
cultures, but the overlap between the two regions’ versions of these 
ideas was not perfect. A Northern-authored Fourteenth Amendment 
may be in tension with the idea of the United States as a permanently-
united nation making decisions democratically as one people. The Civil 
War, however, disrupted our nation’s democratic unity in a way that 
allowed those who stayed with the Union’s political apparatus to 
impose conditions on those who voluntary left it and later re-entered. 
Tacit restrictions on the scope of language are commonplace both in 
linguistic theory and the law of armed conflict, rendering the 
Republican loyal-denominator view not only intelligible but 
compelling. We can preserve traditional notions of uncoerced 
constitutional deliberation only by excluding coerced, congressionally 
unrepresented States from the constitutional author. This Southern 
forfeiture of their rights of seniority is the sort of problem that emerges 
elsewhere in democratic theory. The Northern power to preserve the 
Union by imposing conditions of loyalty more stringent than the South 
desired is closely akin both to the power of the current members of the 
Union to impose conditions on the ways in which future members may 
enter out of the territories, as well as to the power that a founding 
generation has to set rules that will inevitably affect any later 
generations participating in the government created by the founders. 
Understanding the Fourteenth Amendment’s legitimacy can help us 
understand constitutional legitimacy more generally. 
 
